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Abstract 
Exchange rate targets in a stabilization game are considered. The targeting strategy 
consists on the choice of a desired level for the exchange and the weight assigned to such 
target in the loss function. The exchange rate target appears then as an intermediate objective 
and acts as a surrogate to policy coordination. The targeting solution reveals that the 
targeting strategy can be embedded on a straight line in the policy-instruments space (the 
respective money supplies), which greatly facilitates the ana1ysis. It turns out that the 
targeting strategy is optimal when the reaction of the countries exert a positive externality 
on the other country. In this case, policymakers have some flexibility in the choice of the 
target as long as the optimal commitment to such target is selected accordingly. 

Introduction 
This article deals with the design of exchange rate targets and their use as stabilizing devices 
in the face of economic shocks. The exchange rate plays in our framework a role of intermediate 
target, acting as an instrument for implicit cooperation. Countries agree on the exchange rate 
target and -conditional upon 1t- maximise (non-cooperatively) their individual loss function. 
Incentive compatibility turns out to be the necessary condition to render credible the 
arrangement, otherwhise private agents would realise the incentive tQ renege that a return to a 
non-cooperative equilibrium provides. Pareto optimality is a complementary condition which 
maximises the quality of the arrangement and, in our reference model, delivers the explicit 
coordination solution. 
After presenting the model and the targeting framework in the first two sections, the search 
for an optimal targeting strategy is developed in two stages. In the first stage (section III), we 
explore the possibility of targeting the exchange rate for different types of shocks. This is formally 
done by delimiting the type of shocks for which the exchange rate arrangement is incentive 
compatible and Pareto optimal. It turns out that the feasibility of targeting the exchange rate 
depends on the type of shock and that it may be counterproductive in certain circumstanCes. 
The second stage (section IV) directly tackles the question of designing optimal exchange 
rate targets within the relevant shock subset. We will observe that there is some scope for the 
discretion fOT the policymakers y,:ho can choose between a wide range of exchange rate targets, 
provided that they also choose the optimal commitment to the selected target. Section V interprets 
the results and the conclusions sum up our results and compares them with other targeting 
schemes. 
I-Model and definitions 
We consider two identical and interdependent economies (home and foreign countries, 
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labelled with subscripts 1,2). The policy makers aim at minimising their respective loss functions 
(L,.L,) which penalise the deviations of employment (n) and consumer prices (q) from their 
desired levels, which we assume, without loss of generality, that are set to zero: 
[1) 
0">0, 11>0 
The instrument for the policy makers is the money supply [mJ,mJ. The characteristics of 
the economy are defined by the model developed in Canzoneri & Henderson (1988,91), which is 
summed up in appendix A. 
At the beginning of the game, workers and firms enter into wage contracts which specify 
nomina.1 wages and employment. Firms employ labour up to the point that real wages equal the 
marginal product of labour. Workers agree to supply whatever quantity of labour firms want at 
the nominal wages specified in the contracts. The result is that nominal wages are set so that the 
expected employments are at their full-employment levels of zero. Since, as it is shown in 
appendix B, the expected money supplies equal zero, the employment level in each country is 
determined by the respective money supply surprises (m"m,). 
After contracts are set, these economies may suffer shocks on the demand (u/,uz) or the 
supply side (x/,xz)' Consumer prices and the real exchange rate z are affected by these shocks, as 
it can be observed in the reduced forms of the model: 
ql =(.[r/r
l
[ml -28m, +( l-T)xl +TX, -(ul-u,») 
q, =(.[r/rl[m, -28ml +(I-T)x, +TXI +(ul-u,») 
z=(r.[r/rl[28(m
l
-m,)-T(XI-X,)-(UI-UI)) 
O<8<�; O<T<�; O«.[r/rl<l; r<,; 
(2) 
For instance, a negative symmetric supply shock (x,=xz>O), due for instance to a 
commodity shock, will increase domestic and foreign consumer prices, because it reduces labour 
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productivity in both countries and wages are already set; the real exchange rate remains at the 
same level though. The case of a demand shock is less intuitive in this model. A shift in demand 
from country two to country one (UrU2>O) does not modify nominal incomes, but it creates an 
excess demand on country one and an excess supply in country two. The currency of the excess 
demand country must appreciate in real terms (z > 0) to eliminate the imbalance. This reduces 
consumer prices at home and increases them abroad. 
Consequently, shocks lead to a welfare loss which can be observed in figures one and two. 
The welfare loss just after the shock, that is, before any reaction of the authorities, corresponds 
to the origin The quadratic loss function defines elliptical indiference curves in the instrument 
space [m"m,} .. Policy makers will make then use of monetary policy to minimise welfare losses, 
offseting the effects of the shocks on the domestic consumer prices. In partiCUlar, for the supply 
shock we are considering both countries would contract their money supplies to reduce the 
consumer price inflation; in the case of a shift in demand, the foreign country would contract its 
money supply, while the home country would expand. This policy action has a cost, however in 
terms of employment. Furthermore, the effects of the monetary action will spillover to the other 
country and this is taken into account by both policymakers. 
At this point, the outcome of the game depends on the strategic position of the countriesl. 
If countries do cooperate, they would use their money supplies to minimise the joint loss function 
given by: 
LC=oL,+(l-o)L, 
where &,J-fJ are the weights assigned to each country. An Pareto optimal outcome is obtained for 
each value 0, which are embedded in the contract curve (C(O)). Setting 0=1, (0=0), the 
instruments of both countries are chosen to maximise the welfare of the first (second) country. 
These solutions are known as bliss points (Bj,B:z). Since the bliss points correspond to zero welfare 
losses, B]oB, are placed at the center of the ellipses. 
When countries act non-cooperatively, each country takes the actions of the other player as 
given and try to minimise their own welfare loss, for each possible choice of the second country. 
I_The following solutions are derived in appendix C. 
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This set of outcomes is contained in the reaction function for each country (R/,R/). The Nash 
or non-cooperative equilibrium (N) is given by the intersection of these reaction functions. 
We can obseIVe in the figures that the outcomes are in this case inefficient: there are other 
solutions which would be welfare-improving for both countries. This set of incentive compatible 
points is called the bargaining area, labelled A in the figures. It is delimited by the ellipses 
intersecting at the Nash equilibria and it obviously includes a segment of the contract CUIVe. 
n-The exchange rate as intermediate target 
While both countries would gain from cooperation, this solution faces a "cheating problem" 
(Canzoneri & Gray (1985», because monetary cooperative arrangements are difficult to verify and 
they are easily altered in subtle ways. 
Our strategy attempts to overcome this problem, emphasising the value of exchange rate 
targets as adequate surrogates for explicit cooperation because of its direct observability. In this 
sense, Kenen (1989,p.54) notes that 'governments are prone to cheat and will not engage in 
optimal coordination because they cannot trust each other. A government cannot cheat on a finn 
commitment to exchange rate pegging without being caught. Therefore, exchange rate pegging ;s 
viewed as a viable alternative to jull-j/Rdged coordination". Notwithstanding this, in the policy 
coordination literature, the choice of the exchange rate usually appears.as a by-product of the 
coordination solution and it is not explicitly considered. We follow here Hughes Hallet et. aI 
(1989) and, in particular, Hughes Hallet (1993) where exchange rate targets are included in the 
policymakers' optimization problem. We can justify this inclusion more formally using an analogy 
with the optimal contract literature, adapted to the context of policy coordination'. 
Two countries on an equal strategic footing decide to commit to a contract in order to 
minimise the welfare losses derived from unanticipated shocks. Of course, they will only stick to 
the contract if they expect to gain from it, hence the need for the arrangement to be incentive 
compatible. Reneging on the arrangement opens up the possibility of retaliation by the second 
'-See Rogoff (1985) and, for more recent developments, Baron (1989), Walsh (1995) and 
Persson & Tabellini (1993). 
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counlIy and the suspension of an agreement which is in general benefitial for both countries. 1bis 
punishment strategy is assumed to eliminate the incentive to renege, so that the time inconsistency 
problem does not arise and the game can be considered as static. Finally, we have to specify the 
content of the contract, denoted by V. The contract is defined in terms of deviations from the 
desired real exchange rate (t), which enters in the loss function of both countries with a weight 
equal to�: V= Yz�(z-1'i' 
Thus, the function which each counlIy considers is then modified to become: 
WI=LI+ V; W,=L,+ V 
Note that the exchange rate is just an intermediate target in the modified loss functions 
(W" W,). The values of � and l' should be chosen so as to induce the optimal response of 
policymakers to attain their final goals: consumer prices and employment stability. 
Following Rogoff (1985) we can define the parameter or weight � as the optimal degree of 
commitment to the intermediate target, in this case the desired real exchange rate. TIle parameter 
� is constrained to be positive, otherwise what is being targeted is the exchange rate to avoid!. 
When � equals zero, no constraint is imposed on the exchange rate and the result corresponds 
to the non-<:ooperative free-float solution'. TIle second element to determine is the choice of the 
exchange rate target (1'). How do players agree on the desired level for the real exchange rate? 
We lake as benchmarks the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS-a nominal exchange 
rate target- and the target zone proposed by Williamson (1985)- a real exchange rate target, and 
allow for a continuum of exchange. rate targets, spanning between both alternatives. 1bis setup 
allows for flexibility in the design of the contract, adding new insights to the question of exchange 
rate targeting. 
Let us lake the real exchange rate identity, in terms of purchasing power parity: 
z=e-(PrP') 
where PI is the price of goods in the respective counlIy and the nominal exchange rate e, is 
'-Since positive values of � penalize deviations from the desired values, it represents a soft 
hand of fluctuation for the desired exchange rate target; the larger the value of �, the narrower 
will be the implied band. 1bis specification allows us to think of the targeting strategy as a target 
zone with soft hands, where l' represents the central parity. 
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defined as the price of country 2 cumency in terms of country I currency. The ERM regime aims 
at maintaining a fixed nominal exchange rate parity, i.e. e'=0, which is equivalent to a rea1 
exchange rate target eqnal to the negative of price differentials: t=-(P}-p'). The Williamson target 
wne on the contrary implies a desired value for the real exchange rate eqnal to zero t=O or, 
equivalently, a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate to completely offset price differentials, 
that is, e'= (PrP'). 
Let us now define the parameter p, such that e'=(l-P)(PrP,), where (l-p) is then the 
offsetting degree of price differentials. Thus, we can write the exchange rate target in general 
form as a function of the price differentials 
z4=e4_(p,_p,)=_p(p,_p,) 
It immediately follows that p=l corresponds to a nominal exchange rate target, and p=O 
corresponds to a rea1 exchange rate target. The intermediate values present special interest because 
they will provide flexibility in the choice of exchange rate target, according to the preferences ';f 
policymakers. 
We can observe that the design of the targeting strategy is then determined by the choice 
of just two parameters: p and f3. The range of parameters is constrained to positive values of f3 
and to values of p between zero and one, i.e. between real and nominal exchange rate targets. The 
combination of exchange rate targets and values for f3 represents the set of targeting strategies (>-): 
>-=([f3Xp}, V f3�0, O,;.p';'l} 
which, for latter convenience, can be seen as a a subset of A=([f3Xp}, V f3.p} 
Since, as mentioned above, the exchange rate arrangement must be incentive compatible, 
the choice of p and f3 must deliver an equilibrium laying inside the bargaining area A in the 
figures. Moreover, it would be desirable that the targeting strategy places the economies on the 
contract curve of Pareto optimal outcomes. Now we are in the position to explore whether 
targeting the exchange rate pays when countries are placed on an equal strategic footing. 
m-EcoDomic shocks aDd optimal targets 
The introduction of an exchange rate target in the optimization problem implies that the 
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exchange rate target acts as an indirect cooperation device. It is indirect because the optimization 
problem facing each country is equivalent to the non-cooperative case; each country minimises 
its own welfare loss. taking as given the actions of the foreign country. but iW!! taking into 
account the common exchange rate target, that is, the respective money supplies are chosen so as 
to minimise WI' W:o 
We focus in this section on the set A. with no constraint on the target parameters'. Each 
combination of (J and p defines a targeting equilibrium where the modified reaction functions 
R,(A),R,(A) intersect. We define this set of solutions in the instrument space: T(A) = {m/.m,T}; 
when f3 =0. v p. the exchange rate is not targeted. corresponding to the Nash non-<:aoperative 
solution N= T(O)= {m/.m,"j. It turns out that T(A) is a straight line <target line. hereafter). 
passing through the Nash equilibrium. More formally. in appendix D we firstly show that: 
Prpoosjtion 1: The set o/targeting equilibria. T(A), iHontained in a straighiline with slope 
eqUill to -1 in the [mJ.mJ space, where: 
[3] 
This proposition is central to the derivation of our results. On the one hand. recall that 
incentive compatible strategies must be Pareto superior to the Nash solution. that is. the target line 
must pass through the bargaining area. On the other hand. it would be desirable that the targeting 
strategy is Pareto optimal. This requirements lead to the following conditions for an optimal 
exchange rate arrangement, where incentive compatibility is the necessary condition: 
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY: 3A I T(AlflA .. {0} 
PARETO OPTIMALITY: 3A.61 T(A)=C(6) 
Now we will explore the feasibility of optimal targets. applying these two optimality 
conditions to the shocks arising on the demand and on the supply side; note however that the 
figures advance the conclusions of our formal analysis below for certain types of shocks. 
'-Therefore. strictly speaking the propositions below are necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for targeting the exchange rate appropiately. Only when the value of of the targeting parameters 
are specified. the propositions will be completed. In the next section we will focus in more detail 
on the conditions for which P is positive when p is between zero and one. 
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Effect of demand shocks. Asymmetric and idiosincratic shocks 
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Figure 1 - Strategic behaviour and demand shocks 
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Effect of supply shocks. Opposite shocks 
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Supply and demand shocks have different effects on welfare as an inspection of [1,2] 
reveals. Consequently, the scope for targeting may crucially depend on the type of the shock 
hitting the economy. We consider every type of shock, although in the figures we just display the 
cases of symmetric (xJ=xtJ, idiosyncratic (x} >X2=O,U1 >uZ=O) and opposite (x/=-xz<O,u,=­
u, < 0) shocks. From the observation of the reduced forms in [2], we can see that symmetric 
demand shocks (u}=u,) have no effect whatsoever on the economy. 
Figure I suggests the feasibility of a targeting strategy in the case of demaDd sbocks, since 
the target line crosses the bargaining area (A) and the contnICt curve (C(6) for both asymmetric 
and idiosyncratic shocks. This suggests that an optimal targeting strategy can be specified. This 
intuition is confirmed by the formal analysis of the model, which is carried out in the appendix 
D. The results can be summed up in the following three propositions: 
Proposjtion 2: For demand shocks of any type and magnitude, wre exists at least one 
exchange rote arrangemelll which is incentive compatible. 
Proposition 3: For demand shocks of any type and magnitude, there exists a Pareto optimal 
exchange rote arrangemelll. 
ProPOsjtion 4: For demand shocks of any type and magnitude, W Pareto optimal exchange 
rote arrangemelll is incentive compatible and corresponds to w poilll C(l-S), where 
C(�)={m,' ,m,' } E 7lA) 
• (I + 28Xu, -..,) • 
ml - '"'-1n:z 
[u+(1 +28)'] 
[4] 
Therefore, it is forma\ly shown that the targeting equilibrium which intersects the contnICt 
curve belongs to the bargaining area, so that the PaIcto optimal equilibrium is also incentive 
compatible, hence making optimal targets feasible for any type of demand shock. 
The question is not so straightforward in the case of supply sbocks. The plots in figure 2.a­
c display a quite different picture: only in the case of opposite supply shocks, the target line 
crosses A and C(6). As above, the results are formalised in three propositions: 
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Proposition 5: For supply shocks at kost one incentive compatibk exchange rate target will 
exists if 
_(1+u)-(1+u-29)rx,,;x,,;_ 29+(1+u-29)T x, vx>O (iJ} ,(1,2},i ;<j 29+(1 +u-29)r ' , (1 +u) (1 +u-29)T I • 
Proposition 6: For supply shocks there exists an optimal exchange rate target only if 
(l+u)-(1+u-29)rx.,,;x,,;_ 29+(1+u-29)T x, Vx>O (iJ}'(1,2},i;<j 29+(1 +u-29)r • J (1 +u)-(1 +u-29)T I I 
Noting in [2] that the parameters 9 and r are positive and less than li and u is positive, it 
follows that 
(1 +u)-(I+u-29)r <-1<- 29+(1+u-29)r <0 
29+(1 +u-29)r (1 +u)-(1 +u-29)r 
This result supports the existence of optimal targets for opposite supply shocks but rules 
them out for symmetric and idiosyncratic supply shocks'. More precisely, 
Proposition 7: For opposite supply shocks (XI =-x,). the Pareto optimal exchange rate 
arrangement is incentive compotibk and corresponds to the point C(li): 
Vx, '-x,-C(�)'(m,' ,m,'} E T(A) 
• (1 +29)(1-2r)%, • m, ,- '-m, 
[u+(1 +29)'1 
IV-The design of optimal targeting strategies 
[5] 
The feasibility of optimal targeting strategies has just ·been shown, but we have not yet . 
constrained the target parameters to belong to the relevant targeting set (>-CA), where (J is 
positive and O,;;.p';;'l. This constraint is now introduced, so that the issue of designing exchange 
'- For the rest of supply shocks, we had to proceed by numerical simulation. The outcome 
depends on the values of u and 9. In particular, for values close to the extremes of the range the 
Pareto optimal point does not fall within the bargaining area. In any case, for these 1atter 
situations, an exchange rate agreement could be reached because incentive compatibility is the 
sufficient condition. 
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rate targets can be tackled. We claim that 
Proposition 8: IW!en an optimal targeting strategy exists. the optimal degree of commitmLnI 
fl' to an exchange rate target is a function of p and the parameters of the model. fl' = f(p • .) and 
it fa/lows that 
VU,-u" vpE[O,I] - fl' >0, fl; > 0  
Vp> 28 >0 _ fl' >0, fl; <0 
1+28+-q--r� 1+28 
This result shows that the exchange rate target (and the optimal commitment to it) depends 
on the type of shock affecting the economy, but not on the magnitude or the sign of the shocks. 
This is a result which is also found in the existing policy coordination literature, and it greaUy 
facilitates the design of the optimal targeting strategy. 
Secondly, for demand shocks nominal and real exchange rates can be targeted, while for 
opposite supply shocks real exchange rate targets are ruled out (p > 0) and, for certain parameter 
values, nominal exchange rate targets could be inadequate, too'. 
The third conclusion of this section is that there is not an unique optimal design for the 
exchange rate target. It ultimately depends on the preferences of policy makers, who can choose 
between different combinations of commitment and exchange rate targets given the functionf(p •. ). 
This trade-<>ff is conveyed in fl., the derivative of fl' with respect to p. If the policymaker's goal 
is to design a target zone which minimises exchange rate volatility relative to the desired target, 
the higher fl', the better. On the contrary, if the aim is to provide exchange rate flexibility reaping 
the full benefits of coordination, the value of p which allows for the highest exchange rate 
flexibility will be chosen. According to this second criterion, a real exchange rate target would 
be the optimal choice in the case of demand shocks while for the case opposite supply shocks, a 
'-We can observe in [S] that the optimal response to an opposite supply shock (xj=-x,<O) 
requires a change of the opposite sign in the money supplies (mj=-m,> 0). From the expression 
of the real exchange rate in [2], this in tum implies further deviations from the mil exchange rate 
target. 
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nominal peg would be the solution. 
V -lnterpretatioD of the results 
The cases for which a targeting strategy is feasible have some features in common. 
Comparison of figure 1 (demand shocks) with figure 2.c (opposite supply shocks) actually reveals 
an equivalent outcome in graphical terms. Note that in both cases, the solution requires 
manipulation of the money supplies in different directions. This causes a positive externality 
because, from [2], both countries are moving the exchange rate in the same direction. It is in 
these cases when targeting the exchange rates pays. More formally: 
Proposition 9: Th£ necessary condition for the existence of an optimal exchange rate 
arrangement is tlult, for any type of shocks 
sign(m!J =sign(mNJ J ;o!sign(m/J =sign(mr'J 
Let us explain why an exchange rate target is optimal in the case of a shift in demand 
towards the home good (u/"u,>O). As we have mentioned above, the shift in demand provokes 
an exchange rate appreciation which reduces (increases) consumer prices at home (abroad). 
Consequently, the home (foreign) country will expand (contract) its money supply, but if countries 
do not cooperate, litis individual effort to reverse the exchange rate appreciation derived from the 
shock is too cautious with respect to the optimal solution. In other words, a smaller deviation from 
the pre-shock zero exchange rate levels is required to attain an efficient equilibrium. Since 
including an additional target in the loss function has the effect of reducing the deviation of the 
new target from its desired level, targeting the real or nominal exchange rate in the loss function 
will induce the right response. 
Note that this implies a more activist role for monetary policy derived from the targeting 
strategy. Comparing the expressions for the Nash solution (expression [VI] in the appendix) and 
the optimal targeting strategy for demand and opposite supply shocks (expressions [4] and [5] 
respectively), we can express the latter as a function of the Nash solution. It turns out that: 
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on a real target or vice-versa has not been shown. Indeed. we have proved that in certain cases 
(demand shocks) both are valid and in others neither of them is (a wide range of supply shocks). 
The assumption of an identical strategic role for each country in the targeting strategy 
is central to our results. This is revealed when comparing them with the conclusions of Canzoneri 
and Henderson (1991), who use an identical model. In their case however an asymmetric targeting 
strategy is considered, where one countIy (the follower) pegs the exchange rate to the leader. The 
leader sets the value of its money supply to minimise its own welfare function and the follower 
only cares about maintaining the parity. This asymmetric strategy would pay in the case of 
symmetric supply shocks. In this case, as it is apparent in figure 2.a both countries non­
cooperatively respond by changing their money supplies in the same direction, provoking an 
overshooting of the exchange rate with respect to the efficient solution. Therefore, the result of 
a leader-follower strategy is to offset this negative externality and place the economy on the point 
II, which is optimsl. 
In this case, the existence of a leader exerts a disciplinary effect on the actions of the 
follower because changes in the money supplies are smaller. Thus, when the optimal response to 
a shock requires a restraint or discipline in the management of the money supply a leader�follower 
strategy is desirable because the leader provides an anchor to the monetary policy. However, when 
countries act on an equal strategic basis no disciplinary effect can be attained. Therefore, the 
optimal contract strategy may only be beneficial when a more activist response is required. This 
implies that our alternative dominates for demand and opposite supply shocks. 
All in all then the optimal arrangement depends on the type of shock hitting the economy, 
highlighting the case for flexibility in the design of exchange rate arrangements. In any case, it is 
the economic and not the political environment which should dictate the strategic environment. 
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'm NI = (I-2T).<,+U,-Uj < 'm' 1= (I +28)(1 +u+28) 1m NI < (1-2T).<.+u.-u I / 1 +0'+28 I I 0'+(1 +28)2 i I I j . 
{iJ}={I,2},i;o<j 
Therefore, the optimal strategy will always imply a larger change in the money supply, both 
for the expansionary and the deflationary country. This result is confirmed by the graphical 
analysis where we can observe that, in the relevant figures, the optimal solution is more distant 
from the origin than the Nash solution. 
Finally, the slope of the target tine being equal to -I implies that the &\ll!!a.! money supply 
does not change when the solution shifts from the Nash to the targeting equilibrium. More 
formally, the expression for the target line in [3] reveals that at the targeting equilibrium the 
global money supply remains constant and equal to the Nash solution. For supply shocks 
m/+m,=-(1-2T)(x/+x,)I(l+u+28) and for demand shocks the global money supply is simply 
zero, that is, the effect of the targeting strategy is to allocate more efficiently a given glohaJ 
money supply than in a non-<:aoperative situation, which reminds McKinnon's proposal for 
monetary stabilization (MacKinnon 1984,88). 
VI-ConcJusiollS. The need for flexibility 
Welfare considerations should be the basis for any exchange rate arrangement among 
countries. Consequently, exchange rate targets which do not benefit to each participant cannot be 
sustained. Upon this idea we have set up a framework to analyse exchange rate targeting in the 
form of an optimal contract between countries which are on an equal strategic basis. 
The exchange rate target is viewed as an intermediate objective on which policy makers agree 
(optimal contract). As intuition suggests, targeting the exchange rate in such a way may only be 
appropiate when both countries are interested in moving the exchange rate in the same direction. 
While for demand shocks of any type or magnitude an optimal target can be devised, for supply 
shocks the answer depends on their differential impact on each country. 
The optimal contract, when feasible, allocates a fixed global money supply more efficiently 
than in a non-<:aoperative Nash situation. We have also identified a certain room for discretion in 
the choice of the exchange rate target but a general dominance of a nominal exchange rate target 
- 21 -

Appendix 
A. Model of Canwneri & Henderson (1988,1991) 
u,t us consider two economies (home and foreign, subscripts one and two, respectively) 
with identical structures, but for the good they produce (YI'Y,). These economies are subject to 
shocks on the demand (ul, u,) and the supply side (xl,x,). Rational expectations are assumed, so 
that only unanticipated shocks can affect equilibrium. All the variables except the interest rates 
are expressed in logs and represent deviations of actual values from eqUilibrium. The 
disaggregation of shocks and the treatment of the exchange rates introduce some minor 
modifications into the original model. 
The output of each country (yj ) is obtained through a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
It is an increasing function of domestic employment nj and it decreases when some adverse supply 
shock x'll hits the economyl: 
YI=(1-OI)nrX'I; y,=(1-OI)n,-x', 
Firms hire labour up to the point in which real wages equal the marginal product of labour: 
WJ-Pl=-anJ-x'] .. w2-p:z=-an:rX'2 
where Wi and Pi are nominal wages and prices, respectively. Contracts are signed at the beginning 
of each period, so that shocks are unanticipated. These contracts specify nominal wages and 
employment rules and workers agree to supply whatever quantity of labour firms want at the 
nominal wage specified in the contracts. 
Consumer price indexes qj are weighted averages of domestic and foreign goods prices: 
ql= (1-lJpl + t(e+p,J=PI + l"z ; q,= (1-!)p,-t(e-p,J=p,-l"z 
The market equilibrium conditions for the demands of goods are: 
YI =5z+(l-l/ey,+l"£y,-(l-!)vr,-l"vr,+u', 
y,=-5z+l"£Y, +(l-l/ey,-l"vr,-(l-lIvr,+u', 
where rj are the real interest rates and u, are positive demand shocks. Uncovered interest parity 
holds, so that rrr,=':-z. The superscript stands for expected value. Finally , the equilibrium in the 
I-The parameters which appear in the model are all positive and take the following values: 
a<1, capital coefficient in the production function. 5, real exchange rate elasticity, £<1, 
marginal propensity to spend; ,,< 1, demand elasticity to the real exchange rate; ", interest rate 
elasticity; l"<�, share of import goods on domestic basket.The rest of parameters are 
"9mbinations of these: --.={25+ (1-2l")'vl' < 1; r=1-(1-20£< 1; T=l"'Yr<�; q,=T(1-a)<�; 
V�=(a+q,r' > 1; 8=�V�q,<�. 
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money market is given by the Cambridge equations: ml=PI+YI ; m,=p,+y,. 
Nominal wages are set as follows. From the output and !be wages equations above, and 
using the money market equilibrium equations, employment can be expressed as a function of !be 
money supplies and nominal wages: nJ=mrwJ; nZ=m2-wZ' Firms and workers choose the nominal 
wage that minimizes the expected square deviations of employments from !be full-<:mployment 
value, set equal to zero. Optimizing the square of the expression above, we observe that the 
respective nominal wages are set equal to the expected money suppties: 
The reduced fonns are obtained by expressing all the variables of interest in tenns of the 
instruments and the sbocks. It is sbown below that the expected money supplies are zero. Taking 
this into account and redefining the shocks: x,= �x" and u,=�r'Yu;', i=I,2., the reduced fonns 
for the poticy objectives are: 
q,=(.f,ir'[m ,  -28m, +(I-T)<, +TX, +(u,-u,)] 
and for !be relevant exchange rates: 
z=roy(l-a)(m,-m,Hr.f,i)"[T(x,-x,)+(u,-u,)] 
zd=-p[a(m,-m,)+(.f,ir'(x,-X,)] 
rI r- u-u Z-Zd=Vp' (m,-m,)+(v� r'[(p- !)(x,-x,)--'-'] 
where Jp'=[pOl+roy(I'a)] and {i,j}={1,2}, i¢j. 
B. Money supply expectations 
r r 
Substituting the reduced fonns in which expectations expticitly appear in !be functions to 
optimize and taking the derivative with respect to the instruments, we obtain: 
aw, o .  
' ') , - = -a(m, -m, ) +�( 4>+a)(m+( 4> +01 -\ )[(m, -m, )-4>(mj -mj +(I-T)%, +TX/ -rOY(u,' -u/)] + am, 
+p{.{p'[(m,-m,)-(m,' -",,')] +(P-i)(x,' -x ,')-'Y(u,' -u,'») =0 
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Taking expectations, and noting that x,'=u,'=O, i=I,2, because they rep�nt 
unanticipated shocks, it is straightforward to conclude that the expected money supplies equal 
zero. Setting m/=m,'=O the reduced forms for the modified loss function are,for {i,j}={I,2}, 
i""j: 
[l] 
C. Solutions 10 lhe nwdel 
The standard solutions are obtained setting P=O, such. that W'=Lc; The explicit 
cooperative solution is obtained by the minimization of the weighted joint loss function, 
LC=�LI+(I-�)L, where �,I-�are the weights assigned to each country. The solutions are contained 
in the contract curve (C(6)) whose rate of marginal substitution is equal to minus one 
dm,ldmlldL_o=-I, so as to fulfill the condition of Pareto optimality: 
-E,m,-28m,+�[(I-T)x,+TX,)-(I-�)28[(I-T)x,+Tx,)-
-(�+(I-�)28Xu,-u,) = 
=-[E,m, -28m,-�28[(I-T)x, +TX,)-(I-�)[(I-T)x, +TX,)+ 
+(�28+(I-�»(u,-u,») } 
where E ,  =�(1 +u)+(l-�)(28)'; E2=(1-�)(1 +u)+�(28)2 
[D] 
Setting �=1, (�=O), the instruments of bOth countries are chosen to maximize the welfare 
of the first (second) country. These solutions are known as bliss ooints (BI,B,) 
C(l)=BI 1'01= {m/I,m,'l} = {O, (28)"1 [(l-T)XI+ TX,-(Uru,))); 
C(O),B, 1.-0 = {ml ",m,"} =, {(28)"1 [(l-T)X,+TXI+ (ul-u,)),O) 
Since the bliss points correspond to zero welfare losses, BI> B, are placed at the ocnter of 
the ellipses. It is convenient to define the segment which joins the bliss points as the bliss line (B): 
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[III] 
Minimising each country loss function with respect to the respective instrument, and taken 
the action of the other country as given, we obtain the (modified) reaction functions: 
The points where these modified reaction functions (RlA), R,(A) intersect represent the 
targeting solutions, T(A)={m/,m/}: 
T [1/I,(I-T).1/I,T}r, .[1/1, T.1/I,(I-T)}rj [(p-TI m1/l, -1/I,)1/IJ(x, -x} m1 =- + + 
1/1: -1/1� 1/1: -1/1� 
• [1/I.(1/I,-1/I,))(u,-u) 
1/1:-1/1� 
[V] 
The non-cooperative Nash solution is a particular case of the general targeting solution, 
when 13 =0 and RlA)=R/, R,(A)R,": N=T(O)= {m/,m,"j. In this case, where 1/IJ=I+u, 1/1,=28, 
1/1,=0, 1/1,=1, it is straightforward to see by direct substitution into [V) that': 
m N=_ [(l .u)(l-T).28T}r,.[28(I-T).(l.u)r}rj-(I .u-28)(u,-uj) [VI) , 
(l.u)'-(28)' 
D. Proof 10 the propositions 
Proof to prOJ)OSition I ITarget linel. The slope of T(A) in the [mJ,mJ space is obtained by 
the cocient of the derivatives of the target solutions appearing in [V) with respect to A: 
timT ,JtimTJ=[amT ,JoAl[amT/aA] 
'- Canzoneri & Henderson (l991,pgs.21 and 37) only consider symmetric supply shocks 
(x,=x,) and opposite demand shocks (u,/2=-u,I2). Substituting in (3) we obtain the same 
expressions as theirs. 
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Now we will show that the partial derivatives are of different sign but equal value. Let us 
consider the different terms in equation M. When i=l,j=2 the last two terms in the expression, 
and consequently their partial derivatives, are equal and of opposite sign than when i = 2,j = I, but 
the first term is different. Let us denote the respective numerators of this first term by Z" Z, and 
let us express x, in terms of xI> x,=Kx" K E R. Simplifying this expression we obtain 
Z,'(ai', +bi' ,)x,; Z,=(bi' , +ai',)x, 
where a=K+T{l-K), b=l-T{l-K). Adding and substraeting a'i-,x, from Z, and b>fi', from z" we 
obtain that 
Z, =[a(i', +'1' ,)+ci',Jx,; Z,=[b(i', +'1' ,)-ci',Jx, 
where c= {l-K){l-2T). Again, the last term of this expression is equal and of opposite sign, so that 
we can concentrate on the first pan of the expression. Taking now also into account the 
denominator, the relevant expression simplifies as follows: 
b(i', +'1',) b -i-+ = ---x i'�--+i 1+0"+20 
I 
But note that the derivative of these expressions with respect to X is just zero. Hence we 
infer that amT ,1aA-amT,taA and dmT ,1dmT,=-l. Finally, the Nash solution is known to represent 
one point in this line, so that we can derive the equation of the straight line: 
[Vm 
Proofs to pr9J)OSjtioos 2 and 5. ancentive compatibility) Takingasreferencethe ml-axis, 
the slope of the target line is equal to -I, so that tg{wT) =-l, where wT=13S·,31S·. The 
bargaining area, A, is formed by the area within the ellipses crossing at the Nash solution (N). 
Thus, A is placed between the tangent lines to the two ellipses at N. Secondly, N is known to be 
a point on the target line. Therefore, as the figures suggest, if the target line lies between the 
angle formed by those two tangents: w .. <wT< Wwp {i,j}= {1,2}, i ;>'j, the target line will cross the 
bargaining area. The general expressions for the ellipses slope at Nash equilibrium are: 
din, 
I =
_ aw/am, _ (1 +U)m,N -28m/+(1-T)x,+TXj-(U,-u} 
dm, ""1-<1 aw/amj 28[m,N-28m/+(1-T)x,+TXj-(U,-u}) 
Let us consider first demand shocks (x,=x,=O). Substituting the Nash solution [VI) into 
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the previous expression, we obtain 
dm, 0 din, u - 1"",oO=--(u,-u,)=o ; - I ....... =-(u,-u,)=oo timl ' t1  dmi l O  
The angles fonned by these tangent lines depend on the sign of (uru,). In particular, for 
the ellipse corresponding to WI: 
din 
vut,uZ,Lim -z l.,w-o=o-tg(ww)=O m._,,,dml ' , 
and 3£>0 1 vU,-u,<O,m,E +[m."-£,mti, -:::; 1 ..... 0>0 ; 
, 
vU,-u, > O,m, E [m." -e,mt':l.-:::; 1 ..... 0 < O. 
, 
and 38>0 
It follows then that 
vU1-lLz < 0 ... ww,<wT<WW, ; 
vU1-UZ> 0 ... WW,<WT<WW1 
and the target line is precisely the bisectrix of the angle fonned by the tangents to both ellipses. 
Thus, the target zone will always cross the bargaining area. 
Proceeding as before we.obtain that, for wooly shocks (u/=u,=O): 
dm, 1 =_ 0 =0  din, .... . 0 u28[(I+u)x,+28x,+(1+u 28)r(x,-x,)] 
dIn' I"", .. =_ 
u28[(1 +u)x,+28x, +(1 +u-28)T(x,-x,)] =00 
timt I 0 
For WJ and W2, we have now: 
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,, _  28+(\ +a-28)T x ... ,., =90" ;" _ 28+(\ +a-28)T x ... ,., =270' l2 1.+0'-(1 +0'-28)., I Wi ' Xl 1 +0'-(1 +0"-28)., I "l: 
28+(1 + a-28)T < (1 +a)-(l +a-28)T. Thus, the following cases arise: 
vX,<O: 
(0) - 28+(\ +a-28)T x "x ,, _  I +a-(\ +a-28)T ... Ig(,.,,,,) =360' ;lg("'",)=270' 
I +a-(\ +a-28)T ' 2 28+(\ +a-28)T ' , 
(b) X > _ I+a-(I +a-2
il)T "'Ig(,., )=Igo' ; Ig(,., )=270' , 28+(\ +u-28)T w, w, 
(c) x < _ 28+(1 +a-28)T "'Ig('" )=36O';lg(,., )_90' 2 1 +0'-(1 +0'-28)., W, W, 
vX,>O: 
(0) - I +u-(\ +a-28)T r "x," _ 28+(\ +a-28)T "'Ig(,., )=90' · Ig(,., )=270' 28+(1 +a-28)T ' I +a-(\ +a-28)T w, , w, 
(b) X, < - I +a-(\ +a-28)T .Ig(,., .. ) =360' ;lg(,., .. )=90' 
28+(\ +a-28)T ' , 
(c) x,> 
28+(I+a-28)T .Ig(,., ) .lgo';lg(,., ) =270' 1 +0' (1 +q+28}r W, W, 
Thus, the target line constitutes the bisecttix of the angle fonned by the tangents to both 
ellipses in cases labelled (a); for the rest of cases, the target line is perpendicular to the bisecttix 
and consequently are ruled out. The range of shocks for which the target line crosses the 
bargaining area can then be established: 
VX,>O,iJ=1 ,2,i "'j, if- (\ +a)-
(\ +a-28)T r "x ,, - 28+(\ +a-28)T x • 3A I T(A)(),4 28+(\ +a-28)T ' j (\ +a)-(\ +a-28)T ' 
!'roof of propositions 3 and 6 <pareto optima! points>. Let us consider the bliss line B, 
instead of the contract curve, since the latter is too complex to work with. As a previous step, it 
is claimed that if the target line intersects the bliss line it also implies intersects the contract curve. 
We prove this claim as follows. 
Since the contract curve, the target line and the bliss line are continuous and differentiable, 
we can ex�: 
m,c=f(a) as a function of m/=g(a): m,c=f(g" (m,c)=C(m,c) 
m/ =f'(A) as a function of m/=g'(A): m/ =f'(g'/(m/)= T(m/) 
m/ as a function of m/: m/=B(m/) 
Then the lemma below, based on the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem can be directly applied 
and our claim is proved. 
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The coordinates for which T=B are now found for the two different types of shocks, The 
intersection between B and T  is obtained by equating expressions [IV] and [y], 
For demand shocks (x1=0.x,=0). we get 
mt=mt=-m.t.,-�B=..!. 
UI-� 
2 28 
which corresponds precisely to the middle point of the bliss line, Thus. in the case of demand 
shocks the target line will always cross the contract curve, 
The resolution is more complex when sypply shocks hit the economies (U1=U2=0). 
Equating the target and bliss lines, the intersection is given by 
T B (I+a)x,+28x, T(x,-x,) (I -T)x,+TX, m, =m, =-[ +---],,-;;-::-d=-::'-< 28(1 +a-28) 28 (I -2T)(x,-X,) 
T B (I+a)x,+28x, *,-x,) (I -T)x,+TX, m, =m, =[ +---]",..,."";"-.,.';, 28(1 +a-28) 28 (1-2T)", -x,) 
where it is not straightforward to ascertain whether this point falls within the relevant segment of 
the bliss line, Thus, all the possible combinations of supply shocks are examined to obtain the 
range of shocks which permits the target line to intersect the bliss �, The solution is given 
by the following range: 
(I +a)-(I +a-28)T < < 28+(1 +a-28)T 3A 6 -
28+(l+a-28)T x, _x,_ 
-
(I +a)-(l+a_28)T
x, - , I T(A)=C(6), 
the same than in proposition 5 above, 
Lemma lBolzan<>:Wejerstrass) The lines C(6) and B have two common points, at 6=0. 
6=1, Then, if 3m1'1 T(A)=B _i'I T(A)=C(6), 
PROOF: The claim is that 3mi' l (1'-C)mi' =0, Adding and substracting B, we get (1'­
B+B-C)mi', Let us assume that 3mi I B(mi) = l'(mi) =m,', Recall that C(0)=B"C(l)=B1 SO that 
(C'-B)m/1= (C-B)m/'=O, Since B,.B1 are the extremes of the bliss line, this implies that if 
B(mt")=C' (mt") > T' (mt") , B(m,Bi)=C' (mt") < T' (m,Bi),iJ={ 1 ,2),i .. j 
it follows tiuJt 
3m:' I C'(m{, )=T'(m{, ) 
by Bolzano.Weierstrass, and the lemma is proved, 
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Proof f proposition 4 (and 7), (Optimal and incentive compatible points), From [VI] I we 
observe that m/ =-m/ on the target line in the absence of supply shocks. Substituting m, for -m, 
in the first order conditions of the cooperative solution (which corresponds to the left-side teno 
and right-side teno of the expression for C(�) in [II) and substituting 1:, for ihe respective values, 
the following equalities must hold: 
[�(1 +(1)+(1 -5)(28)'+29]mIT '(5+(1 -5)28)(ul -u,); 
[(1 -5)(1 +(1)+5(28)'+28]mIT =(528+(1 -5»(u, -u,) 
Given the demand shocks, this is a non-linear system in 8 and mJT• However, we showed 
that T intersects the bliss line at the middle point; this suggest that a reasonable guess for solving 
the system is 5=112. Indeed, it is immediate to see that 5=112 satisfy both equations. The Pareto 
optimal point on the target line is then given by: 
C(�)={m ' ' I E T(A)1 m , =
(1 +28Xu, -u,) _m: , I ,m, I [11+(1 +28)'] ..• ,
Substituting N and C(1I2) in the loss functions, the welfare loss is obtained: 
WN=WN= " 1 +11 (u - )' I 
, 
2 (1 +11+28)' I u" 
WI' =W,' (1+11+28') WI" .. W,' < W,", i=I,2 (1 +0'+26)1+(28)20' 
and consequently the Pareto optimal point is incentive compatible. 
Proof of propositions 8 (optimal de&ree of commitment> The money supplies of the 
cooperative solution [II] in the cases of demand and opposite supply shocks must belong to the 
target solution [V]. Noting that x, =-x, and (>/11">/1,)1(>/1,'->/1,') = (l +11+ 28+ 2{3p ')"' , it follows that: 
ml' l  = (1 +28) [(u -u,)-(1 -2r)x ]= c [11+(1 +28)'] I I 
= (I +{3.[P'I(r.[,j»(u,-u,)-[(1 -2T)+2{3(P-rlrrfP/l.[,j ]xl -ml' l T 1 +I1+28+2{3p' 
Considering each shock separately and equating both !enos to solve for {3', for a given 
value of p: 
is the general expression for the QJ2limal degree of commitment to a given exchange rate target. 
Given the values of the parameters, it is immediate to check that {3 is positive for demand shocks 
- 3 1 -
VU,-u" {J' 1128';;; r 
�[(I .28)" /)-2r';;;(1 .28�1 
vX,=-x" {J ' =  
(I -2T)I128';;; 
2�[(P-TIi«(I .28)',/)-';;;(1 .28XI -2T�1 
in the considered range of p; on the contrary, for opposite supply shocks the function presents a 
discontinuity at p+=28[1 +28·I11(l +28)-rhrr' > O. Values lower than p' yield negative {J'. 
Taking the derivative of {J' with respect to p reveals that o{J/op > 0 for demand shocks and 
o{J/op < 0 for opposite supply shocks. 
Proof of prooosjtion 9 (Positive externality!. Substituting the value of the shocks in the 
Nash solution [VI] we get 
Vx >O,x � [_ 1,"-(1 ,"-28)T < , _ 28.(1 ,"-28)T <] ,;=l,2,;¢j-, , 28.(1 ,"-28)< ' 1 '11-(1 ,"-28)< , 
-s;gn(m,N)=s;gn(m/) 
vx >0 - 1 ,"-(1 ,"-28)T x :s;x :s;  28.(1 ,"-28)T <, ,;=1 ,2.; ¢j_ , , 28'(1 ,"-28)< ' , 1 ,"-(1 ,"-28)< 
_s;gn(m,N) ¢ s;gn(m/) 
Note that the first case covers just the range of values for which neither optimal nor 
incentive compatible exchange targeting strategies can be devised and other two cases conveyed 
the range of shocks for which proposjtions 2-7 apply. Thus, the proposjtion is proved. 
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